No family pension liberated by death during the casual license; Direct causal link with the essential official duty: Delhi HC

Background

Surender Yadav was serving with Battalion 181 of the Police Force of the Central Reserve (CRPF) in Srinagar. He had taken 14 days of casual license in November 2014 to visit his sick father. On November 9, 2014, while driving a motorcycle with his wife and daughter, he found a fatal accident. He was taken to a hospital in Alwar, where he was declared dead.

After his death, a investigation court (“COI”) was convened at the headquarters of the 181st Battalion. The IOC concluded that the death of Si Yadav occurred while “service” and recommended that his family be granted liberalized family pensions, extraordinary family pensions and ex-gray compensation. However, when his widow (Leela Yadav) requested these benefits, his application was denied by the CRPF through a letter dated September 16, 2016. The authorities reasoned that the death of Si Yadav did not occur in the performance of official tasks and, therefore, did not qualify for such benefits. Tyeatado, the widow challenged this rejection before the Superior Court of Delhi.

Arguments

The widow, Leela Yadav, argued that the memorandum of the office (OM) of April 20, 2011, classified the deaths that occurred under certain circumstances in five categories. She argued that the case of Si Yadav fell under category C (death due to an accident in the performance of duties) or category D (death due to violence by terrorists or antisocial elements). He also referred to another memorandum of the office dated September 11, 1998, which provided special benefits such as ex-gravia compensation for government employees who died in service. She affirmed that, since the Yadav service was in Srinagar, an area prone to terrorist, ex-gray compensation must be granted. In addition, he pointed out that the IOC had concluded that the death of Si Yadav occurred while it was “service.” Finally, he argued that even the fundamental rules and complementary rules (license rules), a casual license employee is still considered as a service. Therefore, he argued that he was entitled to the claimed benefits.

On the other hand, the union argued that the death of Si Yadav did not occur in the course of the official duty, but while he was on a personal license in his hometown. They argued that the office memorandum placed such incidents in category A (deaths due to natural causes or accidents not related to government duty), which did not entitle the family to special compensation. The union also emphasized that the petitioner had already received compensation through the Motor Accident Claims Court, and could not claim additional benefits under the rules of the government.

Court reasoning

First, the Court examined the classification under the memorandum of the office dated April 20, 2011. He argued that category C requires that the accident occur during the performance of duty. The Court ruled that the examples listed in category C show that there must be a direct causal link between the accident and official responsibilities. By pointing out that if Yadav was on a personal license at the time of his accident, the court ruled that he was not involved in any task assigned by the Government. Therefore, he argued that his death did not satisfy the criteria under category C.

Second, the court rejected the argument that a casual license employee is automatically considered “service” for pension benefits. He acknowledged that, according to the service rules, the informal permit is not counted as a break in the service. However, that only does not establish the right to special compensation. Instead, the court explained that death must occur in circumstances related to the performance of official tasks. Citing Union of India v. Jujhar Singh ((2011) 7 SCC 735), The court indicated that an injury suffered during the license does not necessarily have a service connection unless a causal link with the official duty is shown.

Third, the court addressed the COI’s conclusion that the death of Si Yadav could have been related to terrorism due to its service in Srinagar. He found no evidence to support this assumption. The car accident states that the court had already investigated the accident and said it was a routine setback, without terrorist participation. Therefore, the court argued that the mere speculation of the IOC was not enough to take the case under category D.

Finally, the court also distinguished this case from Union of India v. Former Naik Southern Pandey (2015) 13 SCC 625where an accident was linked to the official service as happened during the trip through the government service. In contrast, the court indicated that Si Yadav’s trip was completely for personal reasons. In addition, the court pointed out that the petitioner had already received compensation from the MACT. He argued that allowing additional compensation for ex-gravia under the government’s pension rules would lead to a double benefit, which was not the intention of the scheme.

Therefore, the court dismissed the request for writing. He found no basis for granting liberalized family pensions, extraordinary family pensions or ex-gray compensation. He decided that the widow only had the right to a normal family pension, which had already been granted.

Determined: 01-28-2025

Neutral appointment: 2025: DHC: 455-DB | Leelam v. Union of India and Ors.