close
close
Judge in Madigan corruption trial says Supreme Court opinion ‘does not control at all’ definition of ‘corruption’ for jury

Judge in Madigan corruption trial says Supreme Court opinion ‘does not control at all’ definition of ‘corruption’ for jury

CHICAGO – Lawyers in former House Speaker Michael Madigan’s corruption trial came to court Thursday expecting a protracted fight over the implications of a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision on the federal statute on bribery, including a dispute over how juries should define the word. “corruptly.”

But toward the end of the five-hour jury instruction conference, U.S. District Judge John Robert Blakey told attorneys for both sides that, as far as he knew, the high court’s decision had limited influence on the case. Madigan case.

In fact, the judges in the Snyder v. US, an explosive case involving the former mayor of Portage, Indiana, offered no real guidance on how to define “corrupt,” Blakey said, leaving lawyers beholden to the precedent long established by the 7th Court of Appeals. United States Circuit, based in Chicago.

“The Snyder case doesn’t control the issue at all,” Blakey said. “It does not interpret, much less reinterpret, the term ‘corruptly’… That does not mean it is irrelevant, but the fact of the matter is that the authority of the Seventh Circuit remains intact in its definition of ‘corruptly.’”

Madigan’s lawyers had argued that Snyder’s decision reframed what the word “corrupt” means in the federal bribery statute known as 666, asking the judge to define it for the jury in Madigan’s case as “acting with knowledge of that the person’s conduct is illegal.”

Lari Dierks, Madigan’s attorney, said such a definition would help juries delineate between a citizen’s right to petition government officials and a criminal scheme to influence a public official.

“The question is: When does that influence cross the line and become illegal bribery?” Dierks said. “What (the word) ‘corrupt’ does is draw that line to ensure that innocent conduct is not included.”

But Blakey cited two Seventh Circuit opinions from the last decade that he said offered the clearest guidance. The first says that an agent “acts corruptly when he or she understands that the payment given is a bribe, reward or gratuity,” although the judge said the term ‘gratuity’ would have to be removed because of Snyder’s ruling.

The second case says corruption involves “knowledge by the payee that the payer hopes to achieve a prohibited influence or deliver a prohibited reward,” Blakey said, directly quoting the opinion.

Blakey also said that, based on his understanding of the law, prosecutors have to prove that the defendant knew he was engaging in bribery, but they do not have to prove that the defendant knew the bribe was illegal.

“The government must demonstrate a corrupt factual awareness that the exchange was a bribe, not a subjective legal awareness that such an exchange is prohibited by law,” Blakey said, acknowledging that the difference is “nuanced.”

That means Madigan’s defense team likely won’t be allowed to use what is known in legal parlance as an “error of law” defense, arguing that the former president simply didn’t know his actions were illegal.

Blakey said that if Congress had wanted to include a defense of ignorance of the law in Statute 666, it would have used the traditional term “intentionally” instead of the more nebulous “corruptly.”

And, the judge noted, all of the attorneys told the court in November that they had no basis to make an error of law argument.

“I don’t see any party’s view in this case that a mistake of law defense is available, and I don’t see how I can rewrite the statute and add something that would otherwise be ‘prohibited’ or ‘unlawful.’ ‘(language) that does not have any type of definition,” said the judge.

Blakey added that the circuit standard instructions they are working with “are the same instructions that have convicted several governors and others under 666 for a generation, and not one of them has an error of law (defense).”

The judge postponed any final ruling on the issue, giving lawyers a chance to consult with each other and make alternative proposals.

“Everything I just said is not an opinion, it’s a thought process,” he said. “…Why don’t you guys look at that and then I’ll be happy to talk more about it?”

The trial, which began on October 8, is expected to reach closing arguments later this month.

Although jury instruction conferences are often tedious, this one has taken on added importance in Madigan’s case after Snyder’s ruling in June raised the bar for what prosecutors have to prove.

In its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that “tipping” (or gifts given in gratitude for actions a public official has already taken) is not criminalized under federal statute and that prosecutors must prove that there was a agreement in advance. .

A jury appeared to be fighting over that very issue before deadlocking in September in the trial of former AT&T Illinois chief Paul La Schiazza, who was accused of bribing Madigan in an alleged scheme that is also part of the case. Madigan.

Last month, La Schiazza’s attorneys lost a bid to dismiss the charges and the case is now scheduled for a new trial in June.

Blakey, meanwhile, declined to dismiss any of the bribery charges against Madigan, saying the indictment clears the hurdle raised in the Snyder case by alleging that Madigan performed official acts in exchange for various things of value, including jobs at ComEd for his associates.

Still, the high court’s ruling is likely to significantly influence the language Madigan’s jury receives in the legal instructions, which will lay out what prosecutors must prove on the indictment’s five counts related to Statute 666.

Despite the lack of guidance on the term “corruptly,” some of the proposed jury instructions are clearly directly influenced by the Snyder case, including the inclusion of the word “exchange” when defining what an illegal bribe is.

“If the bribe must be paid after an official action occurs, then the government must demonstrate that the bribery agreement existed before the official action took place,” the proposed instructions said.

Blakey hoped that when the trial concluded, the Seventh Circuit would have new jury instructions that would address Snyder’s ruling. But last month the judge told the parties that the new employer’s instructions would not be ready in time.

Madigan, 82, a Southwest Democrat, and his longtime confidant, Michael McClain, 77, of downstate Quincy, are charged with 23 counts alleging that Madigan’s vaunted state and political operations They were carried out as a criminal enterprise to accumulate and increase their power. and enrich himself and his associates.

In addition to pressuring developers to hire the speaker’s law firm, the indictment accuses Madigan and McClain of conspiring to get utility giants Commonwealth Edison and AT&T Illinois to put the speaker’s associates on contracts that required little or no work in exchange for Madigan’s assistance on key legislation in Springfield. .

ComEd also allegedly showered a Madigan ally with legal work, granted his request to put a political associate on the board of the state-regulated utility, and distributed summer internship packages to college students living in his southwest side legislative district, according to the charges.

Both Madigan and McClain have denied wrongdoing.

After a long holiday break, jurors are expected to return Monday to hear more witnesses in Madigan’s defense.

_____

Back To Top