Summit of the Arab League in Gaza: great promises, there is no clear plan

From the outbreak of the war, several Arab states have held support roles – Egypt and Qatar Like mediators, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan in providing humanitarian aid to Gaza and Saudi Arabia through its diplomatic efforts, but as a collective, the Arab League has not been an important actor.

The exception to this was the Arab and Islamic Summit organized by Saudi Arabia in November 2023. However, apart from the statements against Israel and demands a diplomatic solution based on the approach of two states, with borders in the 1967 line, this summit did not result in any practical action.

There are two explanations for the weak Arab response. First, there is the continuous decrease of the Arab League as an institution to address Arab problems.

Since its formation, and that of the Arab Summit, its supreme body, has experienced many failures, although it has also been accredited with some significant achievements, such as frustrating the threat of Iraq to invade Kuwait in 1961, stop the civil war in Lebanon in 1976 and adopt the Arab Peace Initiative, among others.

The second reason is the general reluctance to intervene in Gaza until the war has ended. This is especially relevant to the Gulf States, which can contribute substantial funds towards the reconstruction of Gaza, but it will not do so until the fight ends.

Hamas Palestinos meets at the site of the delivery of the bodies of four Israeli hostages in Khan Yunis in southern Gaza on February 20, 2025. (Credit: Eyad Baba/AFP through Getty Images)

The call of the emergency summit on March 4, symbolically called the “Palestine Summit”, was an Arab response to the idea of US President Donald Trump for the Palestinian emigration of Gaza. Although the idea is defective and impracticable, it has forced the Arab states to formulate their own counterproposal.

What Trump did not take into account was that hitting the Santa Arabic cow, the Palestinian problem, would unite the Arab states, thus forcing the moderate Arab states to align with more extreme positions.

The majority of the leaders of the Arab states attended the summit, including the new Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who was making his first appearance in the Supreme Arab institution.

However, the Saudi heir prince and the president of the United Arab Emirates chose to send their foreign affairs ministers, apparently after they realized how the wind was blowing. For the president of Egypt, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the conference was an opportunity to give an Arab leadership sample.

Hamas is not mentioned

The final statement issued by the summit was written in a characteristic rhetoric of the Arab conferences and reflects the lowest common denominator in which Arab consensus could be achieved. Therefore, it is not surprising that the statement includes sentences of Israel. On the other hand, Hamas is not mentioned at all.

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Ignoring the negative rhetoric towards Israel, the Arab proposals can be summarized as follows:

A call to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank; A reaffirmation of the Arab strategic decision to follow peace, as described in the Arab Peace Initiative, which would guarantee the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people through the establishment of a Palestinian State within the borders of 1967, with Eastern Jerusalem as its capital; a total rejection of all acts of violence, terrorism and extremism; full opposition to any attempt to uproot the Palestinians of their land; a warning against the annexes in the West Bank that could lead to the region to a renewed cycle of violence; adoption of the Egyptian plan for the reconstruction of Gaza (see below); A call to convene, as a moment, an international conference to discuss reconstruction and raise funds; and a call to the complete implementation of the Alto El Fuego, including the withdrawal of Israel de Gaza and the Philadelphi corridor.

Interestingly, the declaration refers to a Palestinian agreement to establish a temporary, local technocratic administration in Gaza, “under the umbrella of a Palestinian government”, together with the efforts to help restore the Palestinian authority to Gaza, following the necessary reforms within the AP and PLO. Meanwhile, Egypt’s Foreign Minister has announced that the people who will serve in this administration have already been selected.

Egypt and Jordan, meanwhile, have promised to train the units of the Palestine Police in preparation for the return of the AP to Gaza. The statement also asks Israel to honor the high fire agreement with Lebanon, ceases its acts of aggression in Syria and withdraw its forces to the lines described in the 1974 disconnection agreement.

Iraq and Tunisia, on the other hand, expressed their reservations on the use of the terms “solution of two states”, “June 4, 1967” and “East Jerusalem”, indicating its disapproval of the 2002 Arab Peace Plan.

Before the summit, the media highlighted the 91 -page document describing the Egyptian reconstruction plan. The total cost of the plan is estimated at $ 53 billion, which will be invested in three stages: $ 3b. immediately; $ 20b. in the second phase, which includes the elimination of rubble, the construction of public and residential buildings, and the improvement of the land; and $ 30b. In the third phase, which focuses on building industrial areas, ports and an airport.

To raise the necessary financing, Egypt plans to organize a conference with the participation of representatives of the international community.

It is worth noting that after the operation of the cast in 2014, Cairo organized a similar conference in which the donor countries promised $ 3.5b. However, only half of this amount was transferred, due to the concerns that, despite the establishment of a mechanism to avoid Hamas, most of the funds would finally be used to strengthen the organization and finance their terrorist activities, as observed in practice.

The Summit highlighted several paradoxes: first, although a reconstruction plan was adopted, it is not clear where the funds will come, since no country has undertaken to allocate funds. This is due to the fact that war is not over yet, and there is no guarantee that the fight does not resume.

Secondly, with the exception of assistance with the training of police forces, no Arab country is willing to intervene in Gaza. In other words, Arab states see Gaza as a burden for which they do not want to assume responsibility.

In addition, the statement, which, as noted, does not mention Hamas at all, does not explain how the organization will be dismantled and eliminated and how technocrats will be able to take care of Gaza’s management.

In addition, the Summit could not offer Israel any incentive by linking the solution of Gaza’s problem with a comprehensive agreement, apart from a vague reference to the Arab Peace Initiative, from which two states have already retired.

Ultimately, the Summit did not produce a useful and effective tool in the immediate term for Gaza negotiations. However, he granted vague and Arabic approval for the elimination of Hamas, opening the way for an alternative Palestinian ruling body. This approval will be significant in the long term, when this question becomes more realistic. Meanwhile, the path to that result remains involved in uncertainty.

The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and the Middle East studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a member of the Mitvim Board, the Israeli Institute for External Regional Policies.